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Trade liberalization is more important to Eastern and Central
European economies than to reforming nonsocialist economies
- and will also benefit the reforming socialist economies more.
But it must  be accompanied,  or quickly followed,  by rapid
privatization.
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The fundamental issues in trade liberalization are  Trade and other reform will not succeed
how, how much, and how fast to liberalize.  without rapid and widespread privatization.
Experience c  side Eastern Europe indicates that  Without privatization, the resource reallocation
speed is important and reform should go as fast  and supply response to trade liberalization will
as political circumstances allow, so opposition  be less vigorous (in state-owned enterprises) and
cannot build up and reverse the process.  it will be necessary to maintain central govern-
ment checks (such as wage controls) on the
The real reason for speed is that a big bang  perverse behavior-of decentralized firms without
automatically meets the criteria for successful  owners.
reform:  the credibility that derives from a
comprehensive, coordinated reform package and  But even if widespread privatization of iarge
a clearly preannounced statement of the content,  state enterprises occurs with a lag, trade liberal-
schedule, and goals of the reform program.  If  ization should proceed rapidly for the following
these conditions can be met under gradual  reasons:
reform, gradual reform should work - but rarely
is that true, and the instances of failed or partial  *  The political environment is now favorable
reform are many.  for trade liberalization.  Failure to seize the
opponunity to liberalize trade might create a
Reforming socialist economies should  permanently protected economy, as politically
accelerate rather than retard the pace and phasing  powerful interests are likely to emerge who will
of trade liberalization because, compared with  want to maintain protection in their sectors.
other developing countries, these countries have:
*The supply  response  from small and
* Far more price distortion.  medium-sized firms, which can be privatized
almost immediately, and from large private firms
. More poorly functioning or nonfunctioning  created by foreign direct investment - should
factor markets.  be strong.
* A more concentrated domestic production  *  Better price signals will improve resource
structure, with associated lack of domestic  allocation even in state-owned enterprises.
competition.
* Trade liberalization often complements, and
Consequently, it is only through trade  therefore accelerates, the privatization process.
liberalization that a rational price structure can
be achieved during the transition.
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REFERENCES .................  42TEE  ROLE OF ThADE  LIBERALIZATIOM  IN TRANSITION
TO  A  HAURET  ECONOMY 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus  of this  paper is on the transition  from a trade  regime  in a
socialist  economy  to  one  based  on  a (more)  liberal  market  economy. Thus,  there
is  no need  to  detail  the  past  and  current  nature  of trade  institutions,  patterns
and  performance.  However,  the sorts  of problems  that  a transition  policy  must
address  emanate  from the initial  conditions. We begin  with a brief stylized
statement  of well-known  and largely  agreed  upon facts  about  these countries,
trade.
1.  Trade has been highly  distorted  by government  controls,  and has
likely  been  skewed  to  varying  degrees  towards  trade  within  the  CMEA.
(Chart  A)
2.  Partly  as a result  of the  above,  and  partly  as  a consequence  of the
heavy  industry  and  self-reliance  orientation  of  the  central-planning
period,  the  export  structure  has  been  skewed  somewhat towards
machinery  and  equipment  to  CMEA, capital  and  material  intensive
exports  to  OECD (steel,  petrochemicals,  fertilizers)
(Table  A and  Chart  B).
3.  Trade  performance  has  been poor and deteriorating  for  well over  a
decade.2
1  The authors  would like  to thank  Ulrich  Thunmm,  Refik  Erzan,  Manuel
Hinds,  Fernando  Saldanha  and  Alfredo  Thorne  for  helpful  comments,  Michael
Termaat  for  research  assistance  and  Nen  Castillo,  Rebecca  Sugui  and  Hartin
Yokum  for  secreterial  support.  An earlier  version  of this  paper  was presented
at the  OECD/World  Bank  Conference  'The  Transition  to a  Market  Economy  in
Central  and  Eastern  Europe, Paris,  Nov. 28-30,  1990.  The  views  expressed  are
those  of the  authors  and  do not  necessarily  reflect  those  of the  World  Bank.
2  Konovalov  (1989)  details  this  poor  performance  for  Poland.2
4.  With the  exception  of Yugoslavia,  trade  policy  has been
based  on a number  of central-plan  tools  such  as directives,  price-
equalization  funds  giving  different  effective  exchange  rates  for
hundreds  if  not  thousands  of products,  foreign  exchange  surrender,
central  reallocation  and  licensing.  Tariffs  are low,  but  protection
is  very  high from  the  combination  of the  central-plan  tools  used.
5.  Until 1989, only Yugoslavia,  Hungary and  Poland attempted to
decentralize  and liberalize  trade,  but in all cases the  programs
were limited ,  partial, and on the whole unsuccessful  whether
measured  by reduction  of restrictions  or export  performance. 3
With these initial conditions,  all these countries have expressed  a
commitment  to liberalize  substantially  not only their trade,  but the entire
economic  system,  including  replacement  of  planning  with  the  nmrket,  and  of  state
ownership  with private.  The  question  before  policy-makers  is  three-fold:
how to liberalize,  how  much to liberalize,  and  how quickly  to liberalize?  One
might  say  the last  question  should  be answered  first,  for  if the  choice  made is
as in Poland  --  immediately  and  with a Big  Bang  --  the  other  two  quesLions  are
moot. This is not quite correct, for either explicitly  or implicitly,  the
decision  to  adopt  the  "Big  Bane"  approach  must  be  based  on the  judgment  that  the
gradual  and  partial  transition  alternatives  a-e inferior.
An additional  constraint  has been  imposed  on the situation:  the  decision
of  the  USSR-already  partly  implemented-to  eliminate  the  advantageous  pricing  of
its  raw  material  exports  in  the  CMEA  area.  The  import-cost  burden  of this  could
not  have come  at a  worse time,  and it  has  been further  exacerbated
a  Havrylyshyn,  Chapter  3 of Roy  and  Roe (1989)  gives  a general
comparative  picture  for  the  three  economies  that  have  attempted  some  degree  of
trade  reform.3
by the  Gulf  crisis.  Of  course,  these  adjustments  costs  must  be  borne  by  those
countries  who  are  liberalizing  as  wel'l  as  those  in  the  C4EA  area  who  are  not and
therefore  should  not  be  attributed  to  the  market  liberalization  measureti.
Given  these  initial  conditions,  conscraints  and  desires,  a  number  of
issues  have  arisen,  o tnexpressed  as  concerns  about  the  difficulty  of
implementinR  trade  liberalizatiun.  We  list  here  the  five  main  ones.
1.  How  should  one  deal  with  the  unemployment  resulting  from  trade
liberalization,  in  particular  since  the  unemployment  will  in  any
event  increase  with  the  market  transition?
2.  Has  a  technology  and  quality  gap  evolved  betuee[  the  "soft"  goods
Eastern  Europe  produces  and  the  "hard"  goods  Western  markets
demand  which  may  require  considerable  time  to  close?
3.  Widespread  privatization  is necessary  for the achievement  of a
market  economy.  If  widespread  privatization  is  not  yet  in  place,
won't  trade  liberalization  result  in  excessive  transition  costs  that
will  cause  a  reversal?  On  the  other  hand,  while  substantial  fot
investment  is needed  to supply  the  financing,  technology,  and
expertise  required  for  this  transition  to  hard  goods  is  there  not  a
great  risk  of selling-off  assets  to foreigners  at unde--priced
values?
4.  Does the terms-of-trade  shock  make this  a difficult  time  to
liberalize  imports  without  substantial  balance-of-payments  stand-by
support?
5.  In  all  cases  but  one--the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republic--  substantial
macroeconomic  imbalances  still  need  to  be  corrected.  Wouldn't
too-rapid  trade  liberalization  simply  waorsen  this?This  is  the  pessimistic  interpretation  of  the  problems  confronting  policy.
Not eve. one shares  these concerns,  or interprets  each of the issues  in so
pessisustic  a fashion.  But the issues  listed  do represent  the  main areas  of
policy  conflict  or  trade-off  that  need  to  be resolved  in  order  to  decide  finally
how,  uow  much,  and  how  qt -'kly  to liberalize  trade. The  present  paper  presents
a framework  in which these  issues  can  be analyzed,  and in some cases  already
suggests  the  resolution  of  these  apparent  conflicts.  It  draws  upon  the  experience
of trade  policy  reg'ies  and  their  reform  in the  developing  world,  inclL ing  the
recent  experiences  in  Eastern  Europe.
Part II of the  paper  outlines  the  framework  of trade  policy,  noting  the
role  trade  plays in development,  the  main elements  of the  policy  package,  and
their  relation  to the  overall  ecorsomic  policy  picture.  Part  III summarizes  the
main  conclusions  from  trade  liberalization  experiences  worldwide,  includes  some
discussion  of  their  applicability  to  formerly-socialist  economies,  and  discusses
external  constraints  and opportunities  presented  by GATT  and the  Uruguay  Rc  nd
and relations  with the  EEC.  Part IV.  focuses  on the  nagging  question  many have
about  liberalization  (in  general,  not  just  of trade):  what if  any  is  the  role  of
government  in  a liberalized  economy?  Finally  Part  V concludes  by  presenting  and
analyzing  the  principal  differences  between  Eastern  European  countries  and  others
regarding  trade liberalization,  and discusses  how the generally  advised  path
toward  trade  liberalization  would  be altered  in Eastern  Europe.
II.  A TRADE  POLICY  FRAMEWORK
The  Role  of Foreign  Trade
A sensible  trade  policy  is  not  an aim  in itself,  but  one  of  the  tools
used  to  promote  economic  development  or *equitable  economic  growth'  as5
Fischer  and  TholIUs,  (1990,  WPS 459)  define  it.  That  Ligher  and  more  equitable
economic  growth  tends  to  be  associated  with  digher  growth  of  exports  and
iacreasing  share  of  trade  in  GNP, is  generally  accepted.  (Thomas, Matin,  and Nash
1990).  That  more  outward-orlented  trr 6de  policy  gives  clearly  better  trade
perfo.mance  is  also  quite  widely  accepted  (E.  wards,  1989).  Analysts  appear  to
disagree  still  on  whether  outward-orientation  should  be  accompanied  by  import
liberalization  or  be  done instead  via  compensatory  export-prumotion  measures  such
as  duty  and  tax  exemptions  for  exporters  (Sachs  1987,  Edwards  1989),  but  they  do
tend  to  close  towards  a  consensus  again  on  the  following  propositions:
- nmany  more  countries  have  tried  and  failed  to  implement  outward-
orientation  by  government  intervention,  .han  there  are  countries
that  have  done  so  successfully.
- even  those  few  considered  by  some  to  have  done  it  successfully
(Korea,  Taiwan),  have  certainly  at  a  minimum  been  far  lecs
restrictive  than  others,  and  have  moved steadily  and  consistently  to
liberalization.
A more outward-oriented  and  more open  or  liberal  trade  policy  contributes
three  things  to  economic  development:
- a  set  of  rational  economic prices  for  traded-goods  that  is  escential
for  efficient  resource  allocation  (the  c  -'narative  advantage
story.)
the  competitive  pressures  that  ensure  no  monopoly  inefficiencies
arise  in  small  economies,  and  that  push  domestic  producers  to
achieve  the  highest  potential  efficiency.6
the  intro_.ction  of better  and  more  appropriate  technology  through
access  to  foreign  investmxent,  equipment  imports,  and  the
demonstration  effect  of impor';ed  goods.
We shall argue that thcse three benefits of trade liberalization  are more
important  and likely  to result  in greater  benefits  iu Eastern  Europe  than in
other  places  i.l  the  world.
Until  recently,  econometric  estimates  of  welfare  benefits  of free-trade
had  been on the small  side,  typically  about  1 percent  of GDP.  The  methodology
measured  only immediate,  short run gains from the reallocation  of resc'.tces
towards  comparative  advantage  goods,  and did not include  long-run  effects  of
stimulating  productivity  and  competition.  Substantial  empirical  work  in  the  pa_t
decade  has increased  these  estimates  to  more like  5 percent,  and  in  many c:.ss
well above  that.
First,  the  original  estimates  were  for  developed  countries  with  relatively
low protection  levels.  The same arithmetic  that gave 1 percent gains for
eliminating  tariffs  of about  10 percent.  gives  much higher  gains  when tariffs
were,  as in  most  developing  countries,  40  percent  and  more.  This  is  because  the
costs  of protection  rise  more  than  proportionately  with the  tariff,  because  the
'welfare  triangle'  of  costs  has  both  its  base  and  height  increase  with  the  height
of the tariff. 4
4The  height  of the  triangle  is the  wedge  bet_-Wen  domestic  and  world
prices  (determined  by protection  such  as the  tariff),  and  the  base  of the
triangle  is the  change  iin  quantity  induced  by the  pro,tection.  With no change
in  the  elasticity  of demand,  the  change  in  quantity  demanded  acts
multiplicatively  on the  price  wedge in  assessin-g  the  distortion  costs  of
protection.7
Second,  analys:.  of  more detailed  interaction  effects  (notably  including
imperfect  competition)  through  micro, firm level analysis  has provided  sove
estimates  of the  competitive  efficiency,  scale  efficiency  and technology  gain
effects.6 The results  showed  these two effects  tend to be multiples  of the
resource  allocation  gains,  reaching  well  over  3  percent  arid  frequently  about  10
percent  (a  review  of this  wiork  is in  Havrylyshyn  (1990,  WBRO).
Further,  the new growth theory [mosw  notably  Romer (1988,  1989)]  has
established  a causal  link  between  openness  and  more rapid  groAh. Very  'iriefly
summarized,  new techniques  and technology  are required  to provide  a tempor&ry
boost  to growth.  Since  the  immutable  law  of diminishing  returns  applied  to the
new  technology implies that returns to scale on the new  techinology  will
eventually  become  constant,  it  is  necessary  to  have  a conttiuitig  infusion  of  new
techniques;  otherwise  per  capita  growth  will  be zero.  A closed  economy  will  have
to  rely  on  its  domestic  research  and  development  alone  to  achieve  growth.  An  open
economy  can import  new technologies  from  the  entire  world.  For  a small  economy
the  difference  will  be  enormous.  Thus,  the  association  between  exports  and  growth
noted above, may be causally related to the fact that it is necessary to export
in  order  to import,  i.e.,  growth  is "import-led.ft  Early  efforts  at quantifying
6  Although.  microeconomic  studies  of the  costs  of protection  in  Eastern
Europe  are  virtually  nonexistent,  Tarr (1990b,  1990c)  has shown  that  the
complicated  maze of regulations  St! the  Polish  butter  market  inhibited  export
performance,  while  at the same  tmae,  restraints  which  discouraged  imports
encouraged  costly  production  of autos  and  color  televisions.
6 This  idea  goes  back to John  Stuart  Mill,  but  Romer's  contribution  was
to formalize  it.  On the  other  hand,  Kruguan  (1988)  has developed  a  model  of
export-led  growth. One sometimes  speaks  of socialist  economies  growth  in  the
seventies  being "forced  import-led,"  which  of course  does  not give  the
efficiency  effects  Romer  describes,  because  without  the  app 'priate  price
signals  to direct  imports  or incentives  within  the firm  for  efticient
performance,  the  wrong goods  are  imported  and  poorly  absorbed.  In fact,  Terrel
(1990)  and  others  have shown  empirically  that  because  of the  lack  of
appropriate  incentives,  Polish  and  Soviet  firms  which imported  Westernthe growth  effects  of tra.de  liberalization  (for  example,  Baldwin,  1989),  have
stiggested  that  the  benefits  from  increased  growth  are several  times  the  static
benefits  mentioned  above.
Let us conclude  by considering  the common  popular  view of the role of
foreign trade providing  for "essential,  imports.  Too  frequently,  this view
provides  a damaging  rationale  for  highly restrictive  trade  policiea  aimed  at
achieving  self-reliance.  No  one  familiar  with  centrally  planned  economies  needs
to  be told  that  most economies  are  technically  capable  of producing  just about
everything,  but those  that  try  do so at a very  high  cost and  with poor results
in quality as well.  If foreign trade is allowed to allocate resources
efficiintly  in response  to rational  world prices, this provides  the export
earnings  that  pay for  imports  of "essential"  goods.
The  Components  Of Trade  Policy
Perhaps  the  most important  component  of a trade  policy  is the exchange
rate,  both in the  sense  of the  level  of a single  exchange  rate  and  in the  sense
of the  legal  arrangements  of foreign  exchange  operations.  A change  in  the  level
of  a  uniform  rate  immediately  changes  the  competitiveness  of  exporters  and  those
competing  with  imports,  and  hence  affects  trade  flows.  More  complex  arrangements
of  multiple  rates,  full  or  partial  surrender  of  export  earnings,  priority  schemes
for  allocation  of  foreign  exchange  distort  the  relative  price  structure  of  traded
goods.  (See  Tarr (1990a)  for  a  quantification  of the  impact  of  various  exchange
rate  policies  in Poland  in 1989.)
The central  planning  tradition  has utilized  administrative,  nontariff
barriers  more  extensively  than  tariffs. Tariffs  are  more  pro  forma  and  generally
technology  did  not perfonm  better  than  those  which  used domestic  technology.9
very  low  --  the  source  of an important  transition  problem  for  at least  some
countries,  those  which  are  members  of  GATT.  A first  major  step  in  liberalizing
a highly  protected  economy  is  the  often  relatively  painless  elimination  cf
quantitative  restrictions  and retention  of the  high tariffs  giving  roughly
equivalent  protectior.  The  ligh  protection  of  socialist  economies  would  fall
immediately  unless  tariffs  were  to  be  raised,  a  procedure  GATT  membership  frowns
upon. But  the  problem  is  perhaps  overstMted.  First  of  all,  if  a  7ig  Bang  is
chosen  as  the  best  policy  path,  the  tariff  average  chosen  might  be,  as  ir  Poland,
lower  than  the  previous  implicit  protection  albeit  still  higher  than  the  OECD
average.  Secondly,  both  the  GATT  rules  and  the  political  sentiments  allow  for
the  possibility  of temporary  increases  in low  tariffs. And third,  not all
countries  are  that  tightly  constrained  by  tariff  bindings  agreed  upon  earlier.
(See  Part  IV)
A bigger  concern  should  perhaps  be  with  the  temptation  of  policy-makers  in
Eastern  Europe  to  try "new,  nontariff  barrier  tools,  as  a  means  of  easing  the
transition  to  an  open  economy.  The  lessons  of  those  few  that  have  done  so  ir
their  partial  --  reform  attempts  (Yugoslavia,  3ungary,  Poland,  as  summarized  in
Roy  a:zd  P.oe,  (1989)),  as  well  as  the  experiences  of  other  developing  countries
warn against  this ap?roach. All tools  other  than tariffs  halve  the same
characteristics  as central-plan  trade  policy: they  are  highly  distortive  of
price  relations,  ad  hoc  and  subject  to  favoritism,  corruption  and  rent-seektng.
Most  important,  they  are  non-transparent  and  thus  escape  the  scrutiny  of the
market  and  the  voters.10
Coherence  of  Trade  and  Other  Policies
While the small size of Eastern  European  economies  highlights  the
importasce  of  trade  and  trade  policies,  trade  liberalization  cannot  stand  alone,
but  must  be  part  of  a  much  broader  program  of  liberalization.  A  more  interesting
set  of  questions  may  be  put  as  follows:
should  trade  liberalization  await  stabilization?
what  are  the  most  important  links  between  trade  and  other  policies?
Part  III  will  return  to  these  two  questions,  illustrating  the  experiences
of  trade  liberalization  and  their  interplay  with  other  policies.
The  list of  liberalization  or  transition  policies  can  be  fairly  long,  and
economists  writings  on  this  have  mushroomed.  Two  items  of  particular  usefulness
on this are Hinds (1990)  for its readable  thoroughness,  and Sachs  (1990,
Economist)  for  its  succinctness.  One  might  distill  recent  writings  on  this  to
five  broad  elements  (see  Box  1).
The  first  four  elements  together  create  an  environment  of  competition  in
the  economy;  the  last  two  assure  international  competitiveness.  Note  that  opening
up  via  trade  and  foreign  investment  liberalization  plays  a  role  in  assuring  both
domestic  competition  and  international  competitiveness.  In  a  very  large  economy,
one could  in principle  have lots  of internal  competition  within  a highly
protected  economy.  In smaller  economies,  liberal  trade  policies  can  buttress
anti-monopoly  regulations,  or  indeed  make  them  unnecessary  except  for  non-traded
goods  such  as  transport,  communications,  energy  distribution.
A remark  is in order  about  privatization.  There  is a growing  consensus
that  rapid  privatization  is  absolutely  essential  to  the  success  of  the  reforms
in  Eastern  Europe.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  place  an  exact  date  on  how  soon
the  privatization  must  occur,  if  it  does  not  occur  within  two  or  three  years  ofBox 1.  Flve  Key  Components  of Transition
DEC  n  IZATION  OF  ECONOMIC  DECISIONS.
elimination  of central-planning
enterprise  freedom  on  production,  pricing,  investment,  labor,  and
use of profits,  or responsibility  for losses.  As Hinds,  Saldanha
(1989)  and  others  have  argued,  this  must  be  accompanied  by  rapid  and
widespread  privatization  or  it  is  likely  to  be counterproductive.
INTRODUCTION  OF  MARKET  SYSTEM
rapid  privatization  of  a  very  significant  share  of  the  economy;  this
can  only  be accomplished  by a rapid  privatization  mechanism,  as
opposed  to the  val-_ation  of the assets  and subsequent  sale  of the
firms.
free  pricing  of  goods  plus  monopoly  regulation  rules  in  some  cases
(although  import  competition  is  superior  to  antimonopoly  regulation
for  goods,  regulation  is  appropriate  for  nontradable  services)
establishment  of  capital  markets  including  banking  and
other  financial  institutions
free  labor  markets  plus  unemployment  safety-nets  as  substitutes  for
job-security  of  central  plan
FINACIAL  DISCIPLIE
Government  fiscal  and  monetary  stabilization,  including
establishment  of  autonomous  Central  Bank
Firms:  elimination  of  soft-budget  subsidy  world  via  some
combination  of  privatization  and  hard-rules  for  state-enterprises
OPENING  TO  GLOBAL  ECONOMY
--  trade  liberalization  and  attendant  outward-orientation
- - foreign  investment  liberalization
EXCHANGE  RATE RATIONALIZATION
--  establishment  of single  uniform  rate  and  elimination  of
retention  quotas,  priority  allocations,  equalization  transfers
devaluation  (theoretically  one  might  say:  'setting  equilibrium
rate';  but  in  practice  this  invariably  means  devaluation)
-°  internal-convertibility  leading  to a free  market  for  foreign
exchange12
the  start  of  other  widespread  reforms,  including  trade  reform,  the  reforms  are
likely  to  fail.  Inadequate  incentives  within  the  firm  to  respond  to  the
"improved'  signals  from  the  market  will cause  the transition  costs  to be
excessive  and  result  in a reversal  of the reforms.  Since  the  case  by case
approach  of  valuing  the  enterprises  and  subsequently  selling  them  is  extremely
time and talent  intensive,  such an approach  is impossible  where rapid
privatization  of  thousands  of  enterprises  is  required.
Some  analysts  object  to immediate  privatization  due to the  view that
.effective*  and  "fair'  privatization  cannot  be achieved  immediately,  and  this
view creates  fears  especially  regarding  the large  enterprises.  There  are,
however,  a number  of  rapid  privatization  proposals  that  address  the  fairness
issue, 7 so that  one is left  to question  whether  it is really  a matter  of
political  will  to  create  capitalism  that  results  in  slow  privatization.  Even  if
unfairness  is a problem  in the short-run,  the uncertainties  and possible
unfairness  of  privatization  may  be  less  costly  than  the  risk  of  continued  soft-
budgets  and the lack  of incentives  for  managers  to act as entrepreneurs.
Certainly,  experience  shows  politicians  find  it  particularly  difficult  to  insist
on  financial  discipline  of  state-owned  enterprises  when  faced  with  massive  job-
losses. Finally,  to say  that  privatization  cannot  be completed  immediately
because  of  the  difficulties  of  setting  up  stock  markets  and  related  institutions
does  not  mean  it  should  not  start  immediately.  New  small  scale  enterprises  in
service  and  even  manufacturing  should  be  allowed,  as  should  sale  of  retail  and
service  establishments.  The  biggest  problems  occur  with  large  industrial  and
infrastructure  entities.  We  return  to  the  relationship  between  privatization  and
trade  liberalization  in  the  concluding  section.
?  There  are  the  proposals  by  Hinds  and  by  Sachs,  as  well  as  the  voucher
proposal  of  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Finance  Ministry.  See  Milanovic  (1990)  for  a
survey.13
One can for convenience  think  of the causality  between  trade  and other
policies  in both directions:  the effects  trade  policy  'sas  on the rest of the
package,  and vice-versa.  For the first,  the most important  impact  of trade
policy  throughout  the  economy  is  in two  areas:  providing  a price  structure  for
a  newly  freed  market,  and (related  to it)  offsetting  possible  monorvoly  effects,
especially  in  small  economies.  Indeed  the  smaller  the  economy,  the  more  important
it is to have trade liberalization  come quite  "arly.  This  must mean tariffs
rather  than other forms of protection,  and tariff rates that are not high.
Furthermore,  the  more  uniform  the  structure,  the  closer  to a  single  tariff  rate,
the better for the purpose  of providing  very quickly  the new correct price
structure. As Fischer  (1990,  comment  on Lipton  and Sachs  op.cit.)  puts it in
reference  to Poland's  overnight  importation  of the  world  price  structure:  "The
importance  of this  change  cannot  be overemphasized,  for  it  answers  the  question
of  how  a reforming  and heavily distorted  socialist  economy can move to an
appropriate  price  structure." 5
Trade  liberalization  is the  most effective  anti-monopoly  tool  for  goods,
and  requires little complexity of  laws, regulation and  control.  Where
nontradable  sectors  such  as  nontraded  services  and  wholesale  and  retail  trade  are
concentrated  some anti-monopoly  legislation  is appropriate.  These latter
sectors,  however,  are  often  the  least  concentrated,  and  therefore  least  in  need
e  Fischer  goes  on to say  this  approach  can  be useful  for  all  East
Europe,  but less  so for  the  Soviet  Union  which is  more closed  and  will remain
so by virtue  of its  size.  But  the  discipline  of an appropriate  price
structure  imported  through  international  trade  is  essentially  independent  of
the  size  of the  economy,  because  all  firms  must compete  with the  international
prices.  Even if the  share  of trade  is small,  firms  cannot  charge  a price
greater  than  the import  price,  so the  international  price  becomes  the  marginal
cost of production. Moreover,  the  size  of the  benefits  is related  more to the
degree  of distortion  of prices  than  the  share  of trade;  and  distortions  in
USSR are  probably  at least  as  large  as in  Central  Europe.14
of  anti-monopoly  legislation.  More importantly,  there  is  a significant  risk  that
anti-monopoly  legislation  will be counterproductive  because:  (1)  by divesting
firms  of plants  or operations,  it  may prevent  the achievement  of economies  of
scale  and scope,  which are fairly  widespread  in industry  (see,  for example,
Pratten,  1987).  A large  economy  such  as the  US will generally  be able  to have
multiple  plants  and  companies  in  industries  with  economies  of  scale  or  scope,  but
the  Eastern  European  countries  will  experience  greater  costs  from  deconcentrated
production;9  and (2)  anti-monopoly  legislation  generally extends  into  the  area
of laws  against  predatory  pricing,  which  experience  has shown  occurs  extremely
rarely  in  relation  to the  number  of times  it  is  alleged,  and  too  often  prevents
healthy  competition  (see,  for  example,  Carlton  and Perloff,  1989,  ch. 13; and
Koller, 1971). Thus, trade liberalization  is the  preferred anti-monopoly
instrument  in  small  countries.
In  the  other  direction,  the  most important  internal  liberalization  needed
to  support  the  effectiveness  of  trade  policy  is  privatization  and  the  elimination
of soft-budgets,  without  which  the  incentives  to  respond  to  export  opportunities
or import  competition  are  not present. Also,  the stabilization  of both fiscal
and  monetary  imbalances  is  essential  inasmuch  as  inflation  creates  uncertainties,
and government  deficits  usually (though  not necessarily  in theory) lead to
current  account  deficits. No  amount  of micro incentives  to export  or compete
efficiently  against  imports  will close  a current  account  gap  that  results  from
excessive  public  consumption  and  inadequate  domestic  savings. Finally,  it  goes
almost  without saying  that sensible  exchange  rate  management  --  at a minimum
9  An argument  can  be made,  however,  for  divestiture  of  vertical  and
conglomerate  relationships  which  provide  little  economies  of scale  benefits
and are  often  extremely  pervasive  by Western  standards.  If companies  do  not
compete at the horizontal  level,  however, then we can expect small benefits in
terms  of competition  from  their  divestiture.15
allowing  needed  devaluations  and  unifying  multiple  rutos  i  ideally  immediate
current  account  convertibility  - sAn important  complomentary  requirement  to
yield  the  expected  benefits  of  liberalization.
Coordinating  Multilateral,  Regional,  and  Bilateral  Trado
The fundamental  principle  of good  trade  policy  ie  neutrality,  or the
avoidance  of distortions,  discriminating  one type of good in favor of
another. 10 The  neutrality  principle  applies  as well to tradg  policy  with
different  partners.  The  non-discriminatory  clauses  of  GATT  are  not  a simple
matter  of  moral  or  political  fairness,  they  are  good  economics.  Although  the
exceptions  to  those  clauses  may  have  historical  and  political  value  as  necessary
evils,  on economic  grounds  individual  countries  should  rarely  practice
discrimination.  Indeed  this  should  be  most  evident  in  East  Europe  where  the  CHEA
arrangements  have  been  recognized  as  creating  the  fundamental  distortions  which
will  aggravate  the  wr'nching  adjustment  of  these  economies.
There are three  principal  issues  in the area of external  trading
arrangements.
what to do after  CMEA
what  sorts  of  regional  or  bilateral  agreements  to
undertake  such  as  EEC  Association  and  membership
how  to  deal  with  the  immediate  problem  of  very  low
bound  tariffs  which  preclude  substituting  tariffs  for  QRs.
loAlthough  one  can  find  theoretical  arguments  for  non-neutrality  in  trade
taxes  (Ramsey  optimal  taxes),  the  political  economy  argument  for  neutrality  is
probably  the  strongest.  In  practice  non-neutrality  results  in  high  rates  of
effective  protection  for  domestic  final  goods  producers  with  low  rates  of
protection  for  inputs  not  produced  domestically.16
Trade and payments  arrangements  after the dissolution  of the CMEA are
discussed  at length  in the  paper  by  Michalopoulos  and  Tarr in this  volume,  and
will not  be repeated. Here one  may  note only  that  the  pain caused  by terms  of
trade will be entirely a  loss if it is not  accompanied  by sorely needed
adjustment  toward  the introduction  of  market  forces  in the  nature  of the  trade
and  payments  arrangements  of these  countries.
There  is  the  opposite  risk  that  the  prospect  of  a favorable  deal  with  the
EEC  may lead  Eastern  European  countries  to forsake  multilateralism.  The  orders
of magnitude of export gains from removing  EEC barriers are  still  being
calculated  and  debated,  but  early  estimates  for  Hungary  show  this  to range  from
6  percent  to as much as 40 percent  of exports  assuming  full  membership  (Tovias
and  Laird,  1990). Tovias  and  Laird  estimate  that  the  Uruguay  Round  success  alone
without  special  treatment  would  increase  Hungary's  EEC  exports  by  over  8  percent,
and  the  special  treatment  of  6  percent,  (same  as  GSP)  would  together  with  Uruguay
Round  effects  give  13  percent. This  clearly  shows  there  is  much is  to  be gained
from  multilateral  pressure  on  EEC  barriers.  Moreover,  it  is  perhaps  only  through
multilateral negotiations that agricultural  distortions  will  be  reduced;
otherwise  closer  alignment  with  the  EEC  system  may  lead  to increased  distortions
in East  and  Central  Europe.11
Finally,  the  problem  of  CATT  restrictions  on renegotiating  tariffs  upward
are  not  that  constraining. Article  XXVIII  provides  ample  legal  room  for  this.
The question  may be moot in cases  where the decision  is to follow  Poland's
example  and  not only  remove  nontariff  restrictions,  but also  to cut the  tariff
l 1of course,  developing  country  interests  are  not  homogeneous  in the
GATT.  For  example,  while  Hungary  is  a  member  of the  Cairns  group  of countries
that  favor  a reduction  of agricultural  subsidies,  the "Net  Food  Importing
Developing  Countries,w  are seeking  compensation  in the  event  that  the  Uruguay
Round  reaches  agreement  on the reduction  of agricultural  subsidies.17
to a fairly  uniform  low  level. Although  a low  tariff  level  is optimal,  if for
some reason  this does not happen  and higher  tariffs  and gradual  reduction  is
decided upon, tariffs are strongly  preferredt  to NTB's. East Europe could
renegotiate  tariffs  upward  in  exchange  for  elimination  of  NTB's  as  a  second  best
option.
III.  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION EXPERIENCES  HISTORICALLY
General  Findings
There  are  many trade  policy  options,  from  autarky  to free-trade,  and the
first role of government is to choose the policy that will best foster  a
country's  economic  development.  Traditional  economic  theory  favors  positions  as
close to free trade as  possible,  while a competing  proposition,  support  for
infant-industry,  favors  import  substitution  at an early  stage  of development.
The  histarical  evidence  tells  us a great  deal  about  which  policies  are  better.
Within  this  debate,  there  is broad  agreement  on one  point:
sustained  rapid  export  growth  is good  for  economic  grovth.lt
Almost all studies  relating  exports to economic growth, from Balassa
(1978),  to Thomas,  Matin,  and  Nash (1990),  agree  that  in general  higher  growth
of exports  is  associated  with higher  economic  growth. 18
The  question  for  trade  policy  is  what  kinds  of  trade  regimes  result  in  good
export  performance. On this issue,  too, there is now wide agreement  on the
following  proposition:
12 Short  bursts  of exports,  due  either  to fortuitous  circumstances  of
high  demand  for  a country's  raw  materials  or heavy  subsidization  of exports,
is  not in itself  enough  to sustain  the  growth  impetus.
13 As noted  above,  the  new growth  theory  attributes  the  causality  for
growth  with imports,  for  which it is  necessary  to export. There  is still
therefore  an open debate  on the  direction  of causality.1t3
countries  thtat  have relied  oan  outward.or$.ented'
policies  have dove  better  ovor  the  medium  ad  longer-
un  than  those  countries  that  have adopted  I invard.
looking'  otrategies."  (Edwaris,  1989)
There  is  leas  agreement  on  the  appropriate  balance  between  govornmont
intca)vontion  and reliance  on market  mechanisms. Trade  liberalization  usually
involves  a  movement  from  too  much and  the  wrong  kind  of government  intervention
to more reliance on markets.  In particular, it involves  two  elements:
correcting  the effect of distortionary  interventions  that protect domestic
industry  against  competition  from imports  and consequently  result  in an anti-
export  bias;  and  reducing  the  degree  of  government  intervention,  allowing  markets
and prices  a greater  role in affecting  the  economic  decisions  of producers. 14
But  while  correction  of  the  anti-export  bias  follows  naturally  from  a  substantial
reduction  in intervention  through  liberalization  of import restrictions  and
devaluation  of the  exchange  rate,  the  shift  to  an outward  orientation  has  often
begun  with the  introduction  of  new  intervention  measures  to  compensate  exporters
for  the  high  production  costs  they  face  as  a  consequence  of import  restrictions.
Such  measures  typically  include  devaluation,  but  also  duty-free  and  easy  access
to imported  materials  and  components,  export  subsidies  or  credits,  assistance  in
marketing,  and  so on.
Outward-orientation  can be achieved either by  less
government intervention  or by  different government
Intervention.  But in the  long-run,  the  evidence  shows
that  very  high  and  continued  Intervention  by  governments
is damaging  to the  econay and to trade  performance.
14  Krueger (1978)  and  Bhagwati  (1978),  Balassa  (1971).19
While  on  free-trade  itself  history  tells  us  almost  nothing  --  apart  from
the  experience  of  Hong-Kong,  there  are  no  cases  to  analyze  --  the  phenomenal
success  of  East  Asian  countries  (from  Japan,  to  the  NICso,  and  more recently  to
Thailand  and  perhaps  Malayoia)  has  provoked  disagreement  on the  appropriate  role
of  government  ino  achieving  outward-orientation.16  Are  export-expansion
measures  that  merely  compensate  for  still-remaining  import  restriction  cuff icient
or  must  government  restrictions  and  intervention  also  be  reduced?  While  it  is
true  that  Japan,  Korea,  and  Taiwan  did  not  immediately  reduce  their  import
restrictions  when  they  began  their  export  drives,  they  did  not  pemanently
maintain  extensive  government  intervention  but  moved gradually  to  reduce  it.  All
these  countries  steadily  reduced  their  import  regulations  --  Korea  more  slowly
than  the  others,  Singapore  and  Taiwan  1finr- quickly  --  starting  with  decreased
reliance  on  quotas  and  other  quantitative  controls  and  greater  use  of  tariffs,
and  continuing  with  reductions  in  these  tariffs.  Furthermore  the  initial  levels
of  protection  and distt'rtions  caused  by government  intervention,  while  high,  were
much  lower  in these  countries  before  roform  than  in  most  other  developing
countries,  1 i
Clearly  then,  these  East  Asian  success  ocorioo  aro  not example  ox  a
movement toward  outward-orientation  through  new  governmenot  ttervention  alone.
Rather,  they  first  moved quickly  to  outward-orientation  and  then  moved slowly  but
consistently  toward  lessened  government  intervention,  and  in  thi respect  their
experience  clearly  demonstratoe  liberalization.  "Liberalization"  is  a  procoos
over  time,  involving  both  a  shift  to  outward-orientation  and  a  reduction  of
it  See  Sache  (1987)  and  Lal  and  Rajapatirana  (1987)  for  different
interpretations,  and  Edwards  (1989)  for  a  roconciliation  of  the  two.
16  See  Krueger  (1978).20
gr"ernment  intervention.  We return  later  to the issue of the speed  of the
liberalization  process,  arguing  in  particular  that  few  countries  have  been  able
to liberalize  as gradually  as Korea  and  without  losing  momentum.
Another  area  of  wide  agreement  in  the  liberalization  debate  is on  the  need
for an appropriate  exchange  rate policy.  1  Devaluation,  by increasing  the
value  of exports  and the  cost of imports,  corrects  the  anti-export  bias of an
economy and  contributes to  both  export expansion and  efficient import-
substitution.
Minimizing  the  Transition  Costs  of Liberalization
Liberalization  is  often  said  to entail  many costs.  i  Workers  in formerly
protected  industries  may lose  jobs  as  a  result  of import  competition,  and  export
expansion  may be slow  to come as exporters  may be slow to respond  to the new
opportunities;  and  the  devaluation  that  accompanies  liberalization  raises  costs
and may  add to  iiflation.  While all of  these problems may  accompany
liberalization,  they  are  not  always  as severe  as feared  and  they  can  be  managed
by appropriate  government  policies.
Where  devaluation  is  necessary  (and  it  usually  is),  it  will indeed  raise
prices,  but  this  effect  is  offset  by the  lower  prices  on  imported  goods  as  import
restrictions  are reduced. Also,  devaluation  is a far less important  cause  of
inflation  than overall  macroeconomic  instability. So an even more important
complementary  policy  is to ensure  macroeconomic  stability  through  fiscal  and
17  See  Michaely,  Choksi  and  Papageorgiou  (1987)  and  Thomas,  Hatin  and
Nash (1990)  for  discussions  of the  great  importance  appropriate  devaluations
have in explaining  successful  experiences  of  trade  liberalization.
is  The  following  discussion  draws  heavily  on the  recent  Bank report  by
Thomas,  Matin,  and  Nash (1990).21
monetary restraint.  Also on the positive side, devaluation  makes domestic
producers more able to compete with imports,  and by allowing for more efficient
import-substitution,  reduces the employment  effects of  increased imports.
Finally,  one  needs  to  be  clear  about  what  prices  are  increased  by devaluation  and
for whom.  If the exchange  rate was overvalued  before the devaluation,  the
resulting  foreign  exchange  shortages  meant that not everybody  could buy the
imported  goods;  while  some  were  privileged  enough  to  receive  centrally  allocated
foreign  exchange  at  the  official  exchange  rate,  some  paid  a  premium  price  on the
black  market  and some  went without.  Devaluation  means  higher  prices  only for
those  who  previously  had  foreign  exchange  allocations.  Those  who  were unable  to
buy  certain  imports  because  of shortages  may  now  be  able  to  do  so  while  those  who
paid  black  market  prices  continue  to  pay  those  prices  (or  lower  ones)  but  can  buy
the goods openly. In fact, devaluation,  by  encouraging  exports and thereby
earning additional  foreign  exchange,  will reduce  the black market price of
foreign  exchange.  (See  Tarr  1990a  for  quantification  for  Poland.)  Thus,  higher
prices  after  devaluation  are  dependent  on the  buyer.
An  exactly  analogous  illusion  applies  to  price  liberalization  in  transition
economies  such as Poland's  Big Bang.  As statistically  measured  prices  have
outpaced wage  increases,  so the  standard of living is said to have  fallen.
However,  the  low  controlled  prices  were  meaningless  to the  extent  buyers  could
not obtain  the  goods  at that  price. That  is  the  essence  of  a shortage  economy.
Parallel  market  prices  in  1989  would  be a  better  base  to  use  for  comparison  with
free  market  prices  today. The  standard  of living  decline  would  doubtless  be far
lower. 19
19See  Tarr (1990c)  for  a quantification  of the  welfare  effects  of
devaluation  on the  Polish  auto  and  color  television  markets  and  Lipton  and
Sachs  (1990)  for  a further  elaboration  of these  views.22
Trade  liberalization  will  result  in  some  worker  dislocation,  which  may  even
be quite  high in some  localized  areas  or sectors. But its  overall  extent
throughout  the  economy  has  been  exaggerated,  as  a  recently  completed  Bank  study
of  19  countries  has  demonstrated.2 0 The study  found  that  two  factors  minimize
the  unemployment  problem.  of  all  the  liberalization  cases  studied,  only  that  of
Chile  in  the  mid-seventies  showed  unemployment  offoctc  na  high  as  1i  percent.
But this  occurred  only for  manufactures  and  was offset  by the  very rapid
employment  expansion  in processed  agricultural  exports. As liberalization
measures  shift  the  economy  toward  an  outward  orientation  and  reduce  anti-export
bias,  export  expansion  also  increases  employment.  And  in  developing  countries,
export  activities  tend  to  be  much  more  labor  intensive  than  import-substituting
ones.
East  European-economies  having  been  overly  concentrated  on  manufacturing
(Table  A),  and  capital-intensive  manufacturing  at  that,  the  trade  adjustment
should  be even  more strongly  labor-creating.  If one considers  further  the
existing  low  share  of  the  labor-force  in  sorvices  (Table  2),  the  expectations  for
a  lot  of labor-intensive  output  expansion  are  enhanced  even  more. A  recent
survey  of  the  service  sector  in  Socialist  Economtes  [Zienkowski  (1990)],  shows
the  share  of  employment  is  as  much  as  10-15  percent  lower  than  for  economies  with
comparable  per  capita  incomo.
It is interesting  to observe  casual  indicators  of activities  where  new
foreign  iavestment  has  already  come,  and where  it  is  being  hesitant.  Commerclal
press  reports  abound  on  deals  in  Hungary  and  Poland  for  home  electrical  goo4s,
tourism  booms  or  boomlets,  Poland's  vaunted  f.'Lm/cartoon  industry.  Coverage  also
H  Michaely,  Chokai  and  Papagoorgiou  (1989).23
exists  on the  inability  to strike  deals  for  many of  the  capital  intensive  heavy
industries.
Another  important  12Bson  from  earlier  experience  is  that  dislocation  costs
are  usually  low  because  liberalization  has  not  meant  entire  factories  an-l  sectors
suddenly  close  down,  and  new  ones  begin  to  b.e  built  up  enly  slowly. Rather,  much
within-sector  and aven  within-0.rm  adjustment  occurs. While some  closures  do
occur,  the  bulk  of adi  lstment  takes  place  by reducing  production  of some  goods
and increasing  that  of others,  for  example,  by switching  from  one  kind  of steel
product  to another. Turkey's  steel  industry  before  the liberalization  of the
eighties  was  highly  inefficient,  but  Turkey  has  since  bezome  a significant  steel
exporter,  thanks  to a simple  switch  from  big heavy steel  products  to simpler
products  such  as radiators  for  the  U.K.  market.
In  East  Europe,  this  issue  of switching  product  lines  and  markets  is  often
viewed  pessimistically  because  the soft  goods  orientation  makes  the transiticn
to  the  hard  goods  demanded  by  the  western  markets  difficult.  Although  some  firms
or  even  industries  will  have  to  close,  there  are  two  exaggerations  here. Eirst,
the dichotomy "soft-hard"  is not a useful one, for quality of goods is a
continuum  --  especially  so  for  consumer  goods,  but  even  for  capital  goods. Auto
buyers  do  not choose  only  between  "simple"  and "luxury"  models,  but  from  a  vast
array  progressing  from  the first  extreme  to the  last.  Consumers  shopping  for
clothing  and  household  goods in the  West do not all  buy at high quality  name
brand boutiques,  but in a vast spectrum  of price and quality.  While tfne
technology  and  quality  gap  East  European  producers  suffer  vis-a-vis  the  top  end
of  Western  products  may be immense,  what  matters  for  transition  and  adjustment
is the size of the gap vis-a-vis  the bottom  end.  Inasmuch  as existing  East
European  exports  already  participate  at  this  end  of  the  spectrum  and  many  Eastern24
European  firms  are  already  selling  in  both  the  CMEA  and  the  Western  markets,  the
evidence  suggests  less of a gap than the  conventional  wisdom  would indicate.
Second,  the  ability  to  shift  production  quickly  is  already  being  tested. It  may
be too  early  to conclude  anything  definitely,  but  casual  empiricism  lends  some
clues: Polish  and  Hungarian  firms  that  exported  to  CMEA  have been redirecting
their  goods  to  Western  markets  in  the  past  year. It is  necessary  to  perform  some
quick  studies  of  who  are  the  exporters  to  the  West,  does  the  same  firm  export  in
both  directions,  and  is  this  done  by  producing  on  separate  assembly  lines,  or  on
separate  days?  Who are  the  new exporters? 21
The concern  that  export  expansion  may  not come soon enough  is valid  but
again  exaggerated.  A combination  of devaluation  and export-promotion  measures
will help  to  bring  this  expansion  about  more  quickly. Note  the  sharp  expansion
of exports  in Poland  in the first  three  quarters  of 1990  after  the  devaluation
of  January  1990. Barriers  in  importing  countries  are  unfortunately  a  fact  of  the
trading  environment,  especially  for  labor-intensive  goods  and  agricultural  goods,
the main exports of most developing  countries.  But this is a problem for
reciprocal  negotiations  both bilaterally  and at the level  of the GATT.  This
process requires  greater and not  less 'nvolvement  of developing  countries
(including  East Europe),  as domestic  trade  policy  measures  cannot  do much to
alleviate  the  constraint  of  import  barriers  in  developed  countries.  However,  it
is interesting  to  observe  in this  connection  that  as the  nontariff  restrictions
of developed countries  have increased,  the most outward-oriented  and least
distorted  economies  of East  Asia still  come  out  best  in export  performance.
21 In the  USSR,  the  conversion  of  military  factories  to consumer  goods
raises  the  same  supply  response  issue. Casual  evidence  is all  that  exists,
but  it all  tells  the  same story  as that  of the  Kiev shipbuilding  factory
Leninskaya,  which succeeded  in  producing  within  one  year  hundreds  of thousands
of  home heaters  and  ranges  (Ukraine,  June 1990).25
The Pace of Liberalization  and its Phasing:  Lessons from the Experience  of
Developing  Countries
The desirable  pace of liberalization  is a much debated  question.  Any
sensible  answer  must recognize  another  element  besides  speed,  however,  and  that
is the combination  and sequencing  of the many concrete  policy  measures  that
constitute  liberalization.
In  general,  a  pace  as  fast  as  the  political
circumstances  permit is desirable,  but perhaps more
important  than speed  is  to avoid  piecemeal  experiments
in  favor  of  a  preannounced, comprehensive, and
consistent  program  phased  in  over  a specified  period  of
time.
A  'fast"  program  of liberalization  does not usually  mean immediate  or
overnight,  just  as  most  proponents,  of "liberalization'  do  not  mean free  trade,
but allow  for  possibility  of some  tariff  protection  and  modest  state-supported
trade  promotion  efforts. But swift  implementation  is advocated  because  a slow
pace gives opponents of liberalization  (those  who  stand to lose from its
immediate  impacts,  like  highly-protected  capital-intensive  industries)  time  to
lobby for political support  to reverse  the process. 22 The Bank's study of
nineteen  countries'  experience  with  trade  liberalization  shows  that  most  reforms
fail  and  that they  fail  for  two  reasons: the  liberalization  is incomplete  and
so  fails  to  achiove  the  positive  benefits  that  would  justify  it  politically;  and
the liberalization  is so  gradual  that  political  opponents  have  time  to mount  a
22The  principal  argument  for  a slow  progressive  liberalization  is that  if
the  liberalization  schedule  is  preannounced  and  adhered  to,  adjustment  costs
are  likely  to be reduced.  Capital  that  depreciates  need  not  be replaced,  and
workers  have time  to find  new jobs  without  extended  unemployment.26
strong  opposition.28  Examples  of such failures  are  Yugoslavia  in the  sixties,
several  Latin  American  countries  over  the  last  three  decades,  and  Turkey  in  the
seventies.  Starting in 1980, Turkey launched  a much more substantial  and
successful  liberalization  based  on susta 4ned devaluation,  a large  program  of
compensatory export promotion measures, advance notification of  gradual
reductions  in import restrictions,  and reasonable  adherence  to the program
schedule.  By 1990,  it removed  virtually  all its  QRs.
There  are a few  cases  of sustained  successful  liberalization  over a long
period,  such  as  Korea,  Greece,  Spain,  Portugal.  For  Greece,  Spain,  and  Portugal,
the sustained  success  of liberalization  is explained  by the legal  commitments
they  made  in  their  accession  to  the  EEC. The  anomaly  of  Korea's  success  is  often
attributed  to the political  will of its government  and the strength  of its
commitment  to  a  policy  of  efficient  economic  growth  based  on  outward  orientation
--  conditions  not found  in  many other  places. But there  is another  important
factor  in  the  Korean  case: its  strict  adherence  to  sound  macroeconomic  policies,
in particular  fiscal  and  monetary  restraint,  plus a stable  exchange  rate  which
was  not  overvalued.  The  Bank studies cited earlier conclude that such
complementary  policies  were the single  most important  element  distinguishing
successful  liberalization  episodes  from  unsuccessful  ones. 24
28 Hichaely,  Choksi,  Papageorgtou  op.cit.
24  Sachs (1987)  emphasizes  the  importance  of  macro  policies  in
sustaining  the  export  and  growth  performance  of Korea.27
A  last word on Korea (and  much the same applies to Japan 25):  it is
widely  agreed  its  success  is  attributable  to  outward  orientation.  But  many  argue
it is an example  of government-guided  export  success  and hence "proof"  that
intelligent  infant-industry  or  industrial  policies  do  work. Even  if  this  is  the
correct  interpretation,  its  lesson  for  other  countries  is  not  obviously  to  pursue
industrial  infant-industry  policy. The  number  of cases  of countries  that  have
tried  and  failed  vastly  exceeds  the  two  or  three  alleged  East  Asian  successes  of
government  intervention.  Thus,  while one  can establish  conditions  under  which
infant-industry  or industrial  policy  arguments  are  valid  in  theory,  in  practice
they  generally  fail.
The  experience  with  trade  liberalization  efforts  suggests  the following
general  proposition:
successful  liberalization  requires  that the
government  maintain  momentum  and  credibility
'He  who does  not  move forward  falls  backward,"  goes  an old  saying;  t6king
small  hesitant  steps in liberalization  and  waiting to see the results  before
taking  the  next step is a sure recipe  for reversal  and failure.  Bold initial
steps (a comprehensive  preannounced  program),  and a reasonably  fast  pace help
both  to sustain  momentum  and  to  lend  credibility  to  the  government's  intentions.
Hesitation  and drawn-out  programs (with reversals  of some measures)  quickly
undermine  credibility  and lead  to a loss of momentum.  The process is self-
reinforcing  in both  directions.  What finally,  does this say  about  the  pace of
26 Heitger  and  Stehn  (1990)  have shown  that  when all  incentives  are
taken  into  consideration,  the  industries  that  received  the  greatest  incentives
in  Japan  were  not  those  who  were  targeted  by MITI's  industrial  policy  for
growth.  Rather  relative  subsidies  were awarded  more on the  basis  of
traditional  political  economy  considerations.  That is,  even  in Japan,
designed  industrial  policy  did  not lead  to its  growth.28
trade  liberalization?  In principle,  if  momentum  and therefore  credibility  can
be assured,  the  process  can  be gradual.
The  experience  of two  socialist  economies  that  liberalized  their  trade  to
some degree  prior  to  1989 --  Yugoslavia  and  Poland  --  has  three  principal
implications. 26 First, lack of accompanying sustained  devaluation  almost
ensured  failure  of the policies. Indeed,  in both cases,  eventually  the real
exchange  rates  appreciated  at the  same time  as some  export  promotion  and  mild
import  liberalization  measures  were in  place. Second,  the  degree  of correction
of distortions  and anti-export  bias was far too limited  to have substantial
effect on export performance.  And third, the slow and uncertain pace of
liberalization  not only failed  to gain credibility  of producers,  it in fact
undermined  this  credibility.  As far  back  as the  1965  reform  in  Yugoslavia,  the
opportunity  was  missed  for  a  strong  liberalization  when  enough  consensus  existed.
Consequently,  the  pressures  of allegedly  affected  industries  almost  immediately
led  to reversals, recomposition  of  ad hoc protection and  a failure of the reform.
IV.  THE  ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
We turn in this section to the question:  what is  there for  a government to
AZ,  if  th^ _bjcctive  of liberalization  is to reduce  government  intervention?
There is a substantial  role for the government  to play in the process of
liberalization,  in the  transition  from inward-looking,  restrictive  policies  to
c,uLward-oriarftcd,  l'bcral  ones. But  e:e.  aFtcr  …l'ra!'__ti^r.  i…  …--ner.7a-
there  remain  several  critical  functions  for  government  in supporting  a market-
oriented,  open,  and  competitive  economy.
26 Havrylyshyn  1990  in  Roy and  Roe (1990)  and  Konovalov  (1989).29
Role of  Government  in  Managing  the  Liberalization  Process
The  first  action of  government is  to  identify the  objective of
liberalizations  given  the  country's  current  trade  regime,  where  does  it  want  to
go? Once  this  goal  has  been  identified,  as  well  as the  degree  of liberalization
needed  to achieve  it,  the government's  role is to formulate  a program  --  its
timing,  sequencing  of components,  and intensity.
A  second role for government  is to  facilitate  the transition.  This
consists  of three types of activities.  First, it is appropriate  for the
government  to  establish  a social  safety  net  for  those  who are  the  most severely
hurt  by reforms.  It  does  not,  however,  appear  appropriate  to  single  out  those  who
are adversely  hurt by one type of reform,  such as trade liberalization,  and
compensate  them  overly  generously.
Another  role  for  government  in  the  transition  is  to  reduce  the  constraints
to  the  smooth  reallocation  of resources.  New  investments  need to  be  made in  new
and  old  places,  and  workers  have to be trained  and shifted  to other  sectors  or
other parts  of the country.  The government  should  certainly  not attempt  to
direct  all these shifts --  the socialist  bloc experience  has  demonstrated
clearly the  failure of  such planning.  But  there are  improvements  that
governments  make most efficiently  relative  to the private  sector.  One is to
simplify  customs  and tax procedures.  Another  is to improve infrastructure,
including  roads,  ports,  and  telecommunications.  Also  important  are  improvements
in the education  system,  particularly,  during  the transition,  in areas that
quickly  begin to demonstrate  dynamism  (e.g.  textile  engineering  at a higher
level,  vocational  and technical  training  in labor-intensive  sectors  of export
strength.)30
Finally  during  the transition,  governments  should  engage in reciprocal
negotiations  in  the  international  arena,  in  particular,  through  the  GATT. While
unilateral  liberalization  can  yield  significant  benefits,  there  is little  doubt
that  reciprocal negotiations will  add  to  the  gains  of  liberalization.
Multilateral  negotiations  not only lower  external  barriers,  allowing  greater
export  expansion,  they  also  can  serve  an  important  purpose  internally.  Reciprocal
negotiations  help the government  to be perceived  as an arbiter  balancing  the
interests  of those  who  will be temporarily  hurt  by import  competition  with the
interests  of those who will gain from exports.  While everyone  gains from
liberalization  in  the  long  run  (import  competition  stimulates  efficiency,  export
expansion  creates  new  jobs),  during  the  transition  it  helps  to  show  that  efforts
are  being  made to ensure  that  no one is  hurt  unfairly.
Role  of Government  in a  Liberal  Economy
What role remains  for government  as we approach  the liberal  range  of
policy  options?
First,  a few  general  remarks  on the role  of governments  in an economy.
WMat  makes  some  economies  more  successful  than  others? In  simple  terms,  the  same
things that make some individuals more successful than others:  working  hard,
working smart,  and working for the future.  For the economy  as a whole this
means,  expanding  employment,  investing  in capital  and education,  striving  to
increase  efficiency  and  productivity,  and  saving  and  reinvesting  (wisely)  a  large
part  of  GNP.  But  how this  is  done  is  also important.  The  appropriate  economic
role  of governments  is  not  to  decide,  direct,  or command  but  rather  to  create  an
enabling  environment  in  which individuals  are free  and  motivated  to work  hard,
smart,  and  for the  future.31
On  the  international  aspect  of  economic  policy,  the  basic role  of
government  implies  an  economy  open  to  the  world  market  and  based  primarily  on the
freedom  of  private  initiative  and the discipline  of  the  market-  place,
complemented  by  government  actions  of  four  types: 27
- Assurance  of  a  stable,  clear,  and  credible  legal  framework  for  the
enforcement  of  commercial-contractual  obligations  in a system  of
justice,  with  recourse  and  access  by  all  parties.
- Maintenance  of  a  stable  macroeconomic  environment,  including  a
realistic  exchange  rate  and  fiscal  and  monetary  stability.
- A readiness  to  take  temporary  actions,  if  needed,  after  liberalization
to  assist  those  seriously  hurt  by any  unforeseen  changes  (including  the
effects  of  policy).
- Direct  government  actions  to  develop  the  physical,  human,  and  social
infrastructure  needed to  spur  economic growth and  increase
productivity,  but  only  in  areas  in  which  the  government  clearly  has  a
comparative  advantage  over  individual  initiative.
Does  this  mean  free-trade  --  i.e.,  no  tariffs,  no  customs  regulations,  and
no  laws  against  dumping  by  foreigners?  It  may  mean  that  if  that  is  the  social
consensus  and  the  government  reflects  that  view,  but  it  need  not. A moderate
level  of tariffs, 26 and some  rules  of  operation  on safeguards  or similar
27 The  concrete  measures  that  may  follow  from  these  fundamental
principles  in  a  particular  case  are  elaborated  in  Havrylyshyn  et  al.  (1990).
2C The industrial  country  average  is  less  than  52,  but  their  level  of
protection  is  higher  than  tariff  rates  alone  would  suggest,  given  the
substantial  increase  in  their  use  of  non-tariff  restrictions.  Thli  is  in
effect  a  step  backward  in  liberalization  that  deserves  the  criticism  it  gets.
Developing  country  liberalization  measures  should  include  all  possible  efforts
to  reduce  these  barriers,  including  reclprocal  negotiations  and  political-
diplomatic  pressures  that  publicize  the  extent  of  this  "New Protectionism."32
measures  are not necessarily  very harmful.a  What is to be avoided  are high
tariffs,  extensive  use  of  quotas  and  licensing,  and  highly  distorted  patterns  of
protection  that  greatly  benefit  some  favored  infant  industries  at a great  cost
to others.
In  other  words,  what  matters  is  that  the  governments  perform  well the  four
functions  noted  above  and that  any  remaining  trade  regulations  be  low,  clear,
simple,  transparent,  limited,  and  fair  in the  sense  that  no sectors  or  industries
enjoy greater favors than others.  This means, simply, very limited and
nondiscriminatory  government  intervention.
If we think  of liberalization  as a process  over time,  combining  a shift
from  inward-oriented  to  outward-looking  policies  plus  a  reduction  in the  degree
of goverranent  intervention,  then not only is a quick leap to free trade a
liberalization,  but  so is a relatively  quick  change  in  orientation  and  reduced
intervention  or  a  slower  two-step  movement,  first  shifting  to  outward  orientation
and then reducing  interventions. The main difference  is in the timing  and
sequencing.  However,  while the more gradual, two-step liberalization  is
feasible,  it is difficult to implement  without a loss of momentum and of
credibility  in the  drive  towards  the  goal  of  more liberal  trade.
V. CONCLUSIONS:  HOW  DOES  THE  UNIQUENESS  OF  EASTERN  EUROPE  MODIFY  THE  PHASING  OF
TRADE  LIBERALIZATION
Conclusions  from  the  Experience  Outside  of  Eastern  Europe
We return  here  to  the  fundamental  issues  for  trade  liberalization  posed  as
the  outset,  what  can  one  say  about  the  essential  question: how,  how  much  and  how
2  Antidumping  actions,  however,  tend to  be used as protectionist
devices  without  the  safeguards  of asafeguard,  provisions,  and  are thus  best
avoided.  See  Finger  (forthcoming).33
fast to liberalize?  The results  from experience  outside  of Eastern  Europe
indicate  that speed  is important,  and  one should  surely  go  as fast  as  political
circumstances  allow,  to preclude  the  possibility  of opposition  building  up and
reversing  the  process. But  what truly  underlies  the  vaunted  benefits  of speed
is  the  fact  that  a  Big  Bang  automatically  meets  the  following  essential  criteria
of successful  economic  reformss
--  they  are  a  comprehensive  package
--  the  various  elements  are  coordinated
--  the program is preannounced  with a clear statement  of its content,
time,  and goal
- the  above  three  elements  together  give  CREDIBILITY.
If  these  characteristics  can  be  attained  in  a  gradual  program  then  gradual
is  not  risky. Otherwise  gradualness  does  risk  reversal,  opposition,  hesitancy  -
- that is repetition  of the  past failures  of partial  reforms.  No amount  of
historical  evidence  or economic  analysis  can  tell  us  how big  that  risk  is. But
it is  telling only a  handful of cases exist of  successful  and  gradual
liberalization--  and there is by  no means unanimous agreement about this
interpretation  --  while the  instances  of failed  partial  and  gradual  reform  are
numerous.
Uniqueness  of the  East  European  Economiess  Implications  for  The  Pace  and  Phasing
of Trade  Liberalizations
The  above  discussion  has  included  references  to  East  European  experiences
where  it  was  applicable to  certain  "lessons, from  attempts at  trade
liberalization. Here we wish to systematically  discuss  the question  of how34
unique  is East Europe,  and  consequently  how  would the lessonn  from  experience
need to  be modified  in the  Eastern  European  context?
Certainly,  these economies  are different in a  number of important
respects  from  developing  countries  which  have attempted  trade liberalization:
(1)  the degree  of distortion  in relative  prices  is dramatically  greater;  (2)
factor  markets  function  much  more  poorly  if  at alls (3)  the  domestic  production
structure  is  considerably  more  concentrated  than  in  non-socialist  economies;  (4)
the external  trade regime  has been dichotomized  into a hard currency  and a
transferable  rouble  region  (the  CMEA,  which  has  been discussed  above);  (5)  the
political  support  for  market  based  reform,  including  trade  reform,  is  relatively
strong,  at least  for  the  near futuret  and,  what is probably  the  most  important
distinction,  (6) the extent of state ownership  is much greater, generally
encompassing  more than 90 percent  of industrial  production.  In general,  these
differences  tend to indicate  that the reforming  socialist  economy  should
accelerate  rather  taan  retard  the  pDace  of.  and  2hasing  of  trade  liberalization.
While  importing  a  rational  set  of  relative  prices  into  the  economy as  a
signal  to  resource  reallocation  is  an  important  feature  of  trade  liberalization
everywhere,  due  to  differences  (1)  and  (2)  the  benefits  of  the  liberalizatior.  in
this  regard  will  be  much  larger.  Despite  the  fact  that  in  many cases  relative
prices  in  socialist  economies  are  bizarre  by the  standards  of  world  markots,  and
factor  markets  in  Eastern  Europe  remain  in their  infant  stage,  making  it
virtually  impnssible  to  establish  a  rational  set  of  relative  prices  in  a  closed
economy,  the reforming  socialist  economy  can establish  appropriato  relative
prices  for  traded  goods  through  trade  liberalization.  Thus,  there  is a growing
consensus  (for  example,  Lipton  and  Sachs,  1990;  and  Fisher,  1990)  that  for  those35
reasonufj  trado  liberalization  is  more  iaportant  and  will  provide  considerably  more
bonefito  In  roformin>g  cocialiot  economies.
Similavly,  the  concentrated  niaturo  uf  the  domestic  production  structure
implJo.A  that  domestic  competition  will  be weak,  so that  distortions  due  to
monopolit.ic  pricing  will  be high.  More importantly,  there  is considerable
prorntire  in EnRtern  turopean  countries  to  divest  enterprises  into  smaller
entities;  without  import  competition  that  pressure  may  be  irresistible  and  in
many casos  appropriate;  but  as  mentioned  above,  given  the  relatively  small  size
of  the  economies,  in  many  cases  this  will  lead  to  a  lose  of  economies  of  scale
or  scope.  Thus,  rapid  liberalization  will  not  only  add  competition,  it  may  also
prevent  the  lose  of  productive  efficiency.
Given  the  strong  political  support  for  market  reform,  including  trade
reform,  it  may  be  wise  to  seize  the  moment  and  rapidly  liberalize.  If  trade
reform  is  phased  in  over  a  number  of  years,  political  forces  in  opposition  to  the
reform  may  organize  to  stop  the  process.  The  outcome  may  be  an  economy  with  a
highly  distorted  pattern  of  protection.
On  the  other  hand,  the  long  run  hope  of  Eastern  European  countries  is  to
integrate  themselves  into  the  western  trading  community,  and  in  particular  into
the  EC.  Although  there  has  been  no  formal  application  for  EC  membership,  public
statements  to this effect  have been made by leaders  of some  Eastern  European
countries. The  EC has  not formulated  an official  position  in  response,  but  the
EC  discussions  on  association  agreements  with  Poland,  Hungary  and  the  Czech  and
Slovak  Republic  have  already  begun  which  will  probably  become  effective  in  1992.
For  the  first  couple  of  years,  the  Eastern  Eurooean  countries  would  not  be  called
upon  to  make  reciprocal  concessions  toward  the  EC,  i.e.,  the  agreements  would  be
like  the  cooperation  agreements  that  the  EC  maintains  with  many  Mediterranean36
countries  such  as  Morocco  and  Tunisia,  which  grant  tariff  free  access  to the  EC
markets  for  non-sensitive  products  without  similar  EC access  to the  markets  of
the LDCs. 8 0 Eventually,  however,  reciprocal  reduction  of trade  barriers  and
some  hermonization  of laws  would  be required.
Consequently,  pressure  to  liberalize  as  part  of  Association  agreements  with
the  EC  will  likely  induce  a  liberalization  over  a  10-15  year  period;  this  was  the
pattern  for Spain,  Greece  and Portugal.  In certain  sectors  in which  the EC is
protectionist,  notably  agriculture,  pressure  from the EC will not assure  an
efficient system. Moreover, as the  case of Greece shows, the  long term
liberalization  was  not  a  guarantee  of  an  undistorted  growing  economy.  Rather  than
allow adjustment  in response  to changes  in relative  prices  dictated  by trade
liber8l9z+tion,  Greece  choose  to subsidize  or  nationalize  a number  of sectors,
resul..nng  In large  budget  deficits  and  a  reduction  of growth.  Thus,  despite  the
external  pressure  of  the  EC,  a  rapid  liberalization  appears  preferable,  but  these
countries  are  in  a  better  position  than  most  to  successfully  achieve  a  long  slow
liberalization  due to their  emerging  relationship  with the  EC.
The  principle  hesitation  one  must  have  regarding  rapid  trade  liberalization
in Eastern Europe  is the lack of widespread  privatization.  As some sectors
contract  due to a decline  in relative  prices,  there  will be opportunities  in
others.  Without  adequate  numbers  of  entrepreneurs  it  is  difficult  to  see  who  will
seize  the  opportunities  provided  by the  changing  relative  prices  and  who will
thereby  provide  emjloyment  and new output.  That is, the supply  response  will
likely  be  muted.  Moreover,  theoretical  considerations  of  how  decentralized  firms
without  private  owners  respond  to  different  price  signals  indicate  that  in  some
30  The  agreements  are  like;y  to have separate  arrangements  for  the
sensitivel  products  like  textiles  and  apparel,  steel  and  agricultural
products.37
forms,  the output response  is perverse  (Ward,  1958 showed  that  in  the labor
managed  firm,  output  may  decrease  in  response  to  a  price  increase).  Although  not
existing  in  its  pure  Yugoslavian  form,  there  is  a  strong  element  of  labor  control
in  many  decentralized  Eastern  European  firms.  Labor  controlled  firms  tend  to  pav
high  wages  and  decapitalize  the  firm which  has required  some  Eastern  European
governments  (Poland  and  Hungary  for  erample),  which  attempted  decentralization
without private ownership,  to reimpose  central controls  on the wage  rate
increases  and on investment. 8 1 This would seem to imply that the transition
costs  might  be  much larger  than  in  market  oriented  economies.  T  h  e
importance of  privatization extends beyond trade  liberalization  to  the
effectiveness  of decontrol  of prices,  of financial  market reform  and to all
reforms that involve  improving  the price signals in the  -onomy. All these
reforms  are  likely  to  unravel  and  fail  without  privatization  because  they  depend
for their effectiveness  on the firm responding  appropriately  to the improved
price signals.  Thus,  privatization  must  proceed  rapidly.
Although  a  number  of  Eastern  European  countries  are  prepared  to  undertake
trade  liberalization  (and  other  price  reforms)  rapidly,  most  appear,  for  either
political  or  institutional  reasons,  to  desire  a  phased  privatization  process.  The
clear  first  best  policy  is to implement  both  reforms  and rapidly.  The  question
which remains,  however,  is that  in this  second  best  world,  and  given  that  even
rapid privatization  schemes envisage at least a  year or two until proper
'ncentives  are established  for  the large  enterprises,  whether:  (1)  trade (and
other)  reforms  must  await  the  implementation  of  widespread  privatization;  or '2)
if privatization  of small  and  medium  enterprises  starts  immediately  and it is
81These  facts  indicate  that  true  decentralization  without  owners  is
likely  to  be counterproductive.  See  Hinds  or Saldanha  for  an elaboration.38
anticipated  that  significant  privatization  of  large  enterprises  wvil  occur  within
two  or three  years  it is  better  to  undertake  reforms  that  improve  the  price
signals  such as trade liberalLzation.  Thli Li a questlon  of the optimal
transition  In  a second  best  world.
There  a  number  of  risks  ln  the  fLrst  approach,  both  economLc  and  politLcal
economLe.  First,  the  economic.  A strong  case  has  been  made  that  decentralLsatLon
wlthout  prlvate  ownership  i8  llkely  to  be  counterproductlve.  But  if  prLvatlzatLon
of  the  small  and  medlum  enterprises  occurs  very  rapidly,  and  lf  free  entry  of
private  firms  is allowed  anywhere,  then a slgnificant  amount  of resource
allocation  will  very  quLckly  be  determined  by  private  owners,  even  if  the  large
state  enterprlses  remain  temporarily  non-prlvate.  Clearly  resource  allocatlon
decisions  by  the  private  flrms  will  be  dramatically  improved  by  improved  prlce
signals,  and  this  lncludes  the  formatlon  of  large  companies  by  foreign  Lnvestors.
Moreover,  even  though  the state  owned  enterprlses  will  not  respond  as
rapidly  or  efficiently  as  prlvate  firms  to  an  improved  set  of  prlce  slgnals,
thelr  performance  will  likely  improve  under  a  regime  of  improved  prlce  signals
and  tightened  budget  constralnts.  Many  of  the  Pollsh  state  companies  made  an
impressive  number  of changes  durlng  1990  ln response  to  the  changed  price
signals.  This  has  involved  developlng  new  product  lines  and  markets,  including
selling  components  of a production  process  to Western  flrms,  and  acquiring
Western  joint  venture  partners  for  marketing  and  technology  skills. 82 Conslder
new investment.  The logic  of the argument  that  improved  prlce  signals  are
lrrelevant  for  the  state  owned  erterprises,  would  allow,  say  Poland,  to  invest
ln  greenhouses  to  produce  bananas,  at  massive  cost  to  the  economy.  Consequently,
8 2See  Jorgenson,  Gelb  and  Singh  (1990).  Jeffrey  Sachs  has  also  reported
similar  behavior  among  Pollsh  fLrms.39
it is  preferable  to have investment  choices  based  on the  best set  of relative
prices  and  costs  available,  which  as stated  above,  can  only  be obtained  in the
transition  in  Eastern  Europe  through  trade  liberalization.
Moreover,  trade  liberalization may  facilitate  and  therefore  be
complementary  to  the  process  of  privatization.  As  has  been  emphasized  by  Winiecki
(1990),  privatization  will be resisted  by  the  vast bureaucracy  which receives
rent  from  state  ownership. 88 As the  privatization  process  begins,  new private
firms  will require  inputs,  which if supplied  domestically,  will  be supplied  by
state  enterprises. If firms  do not  have  access  to imports,  those  in the  state
bureaucracy  who oppose  privatization  will be able to sabotage  it by denying
important  inputs  to the  private  finms.  If the  economy  is  open,  however,  inputs
can  be imported,  and  the  private  firms  can  expand  more rapidly.
On the  political  economy  side,  note  that  privatization  is  a  necessary,  but
not  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  creation  of  an  efficient  market  economy.  There
are  many  ways  to  distort  price  signals  and  retard  growth  in  predominantly  private
economies  (including  trade  protection).  Privatization  will  install  capital  owners
whc  will  collaborate  with  workers  in  the  preservation  of rents.  This  may  make it
more  difficult  to  remove  the  trade  restrictions,  especially  if,  by assumption  of
the  argument  trade  reform  is  presently  possible.  Given  the  political  momentum  for
reform,  it  appears  judicious  to  take  whatever  economic  reform  that  is  politically
possible  in  the  present,  for  fear  that  it  will  not  be possible  to obtain  later.
88Formerly  this  was controlled  by the  Communist  party "nomenklatural  who
appointed  party "apparatchiks"  to relatively  well paid  positions  in the
economic  bureaucracy,  where the  latter  may include  company  managers.  These
bureaucrats  in turn  distributed  rents  to the  nomenklatura  in various  ways such
as the  allocation  of goods  in  excess  demand  at the  grossly  undervalued  prices.
See  Winiecki,  among  others,  for  details.  While  the  Communist  party  has lost
control  in  most of East  and  Central  Europe,  an economic  bureaucracy  remains,
many of  whom  will attempt  to  protect  rents.40
Another  risk  of the  first  approach  is  that  if  one  awaits  a full  package
of politically  acceptable  reforms,  the  impatience  for the start  of the reform
process  may result  in a loss of confidence  in the government.  For example.
despite  the  fact  that  the  government  of  Bulgaria  had  plans  for  widespread  price
and trade reforms,  it took almost  no action  on its reform  program in 1990,
demanding a wider political consensus.  At the enc.  of November 1990, the
government  was forced  to  resign  and  new  elections  were scheduled  for  the  spring
of 1991.
Poland  is a test case for the second  approach.  It undertook  a Big Bang
approach  to trade liberalization  and other reforms,  while at the same time
embarking  on  a  multifaceted  phased  approach  to  privatization.  Free  entry  of  new
private  firms  was permitted,  which  resulted  in  the  net  creation  of over  25,000
small  and medium scale private  enterprises  in 1990.34  In addition,  Poland's
Hinistry  of  Ownership  has  prepared  a  program  that  emphasizes  rapid  privatization,
with a view to eventually  privatizing  8,000 large  state  owned enterprises. 86
Elected  to the  Presidency  in  a landslide  in  December  1990,  Lech  Walesa  pledged
in the  campaign  to accelerate  the  privatization  process.  I>.  successful,  Poland
will demonstrate  the feasibility  of the path of undertaking  trade and price
reform  with a  multifaceted  phased  privatization  program.
In  summary,  rapid  implementation  of  privatization  and  trade  liberalization
is the best approach.  Trade  and other  reforms  to improve  price signals  will
ultimately  be unsuccessful  if rot accompanied  by widespread  privatization.  It
appears  best,  however,  to  embark  on  trade  liberalization  immediately,  even if  a
34Statement  of S. Gromulka  at the  Conference  on Enterprise  Restructuring
in Eastern  Europe,  The  World  Bank,  December  14,  1990.
a'Government  of Poland,  Ministry  of Ownership,  "Privatization  Program,"
October  26,  1990.41
program of privatization  will be phased in over time. Delay in a  trade
liberalization  program  runs  the  risk  of  creating  a  permanently  protected  economy.
Until  wide  privatization  is  achieved,  however,  one  should  expect  that  the  supply
response  and  resource  reallocation  that  is  desired  from  trade  liberalization  will
be less  vigorous  in the state  owned  enterprises;  and it  will be necessary  to
maintain  certain  central  governmeat  checks  on  the  perverse  behavior  of
decentralized  firms  without  owners  (such  as wage rate  controls).  On the  other
hand, supply response can be expected to be strong  from the small and medium
firms  which can be privatized  almost  immediately,  and from firms  created  from
foreign  direct  investment.  Moreover,  improved  price  signals  can  be expected  to
improve  resource  allocation  even in the state owned enterprises,  and trade
liberalization  may  stimulate  or  be complementary  to the  process  of  accelerating
privatization.42
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TABLE  A.  COMPOSITION  AND  DIRECTION OF EXPORTS  FOR SELECTED  CMEA  COUNTRIES
For  Most  Recent  Data  Available  (1987-1989)
BULGARIA  OECD  SOCIALIST  LDC
Raw  materials  372  132  251
Fuels  131  6S  72
Equipment  252  682  47X
Manufactures  251  122  211
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  OECD  SOCIALIST  LDC
Raw  materials  202  4S  142
Fuels  32  32  42
Equipment  281  65t  441
Manufactures  492  291  391
HUNGARY  OECD  SOCIALIST  LDC
Raw  materials  311  202  131
Fuels  82  12  21
Equipment  261  57Z  601
Manufactures  352  22Z  261
POLAND  OECD  SOCIALIST  LDC
Raw  materials  341  62  171
Fuels  15S  8S  11Z
Equipment  222  611  402
Manufactures  292  29S  322
ROMANIA  OECD  SOCIALIST  LDC
Raw  materials  71  23Z  121
Fuels  452  O0  82
Equipment  122  591  471
Manufactures  361  181  331
USSR  OECD  SOCIALIST  LDC
Raw  materials  171  22Z  161
Fuels  571  41S  402
Equipment  91  33Z  24S
Manufactures  171  5  212
YUGOSLAVIA  OECD  SOCIALIST  LDC
Raw  materials  191  72  131
Fuels  31  O0  OX
Equipment  291  572  452
Manufactures  502  362  411
TRADE  CATEGORIZATIONS
Raw  materials  include  food,  agricultural  and  other  primary  goods. Fuels  include
mineral  and other fuels  and related  products. Equipment  includes  machinery,
transportation  and  other  equipment,  and  chemicals. Manufactures  include  those
categorized  by  material  as  well as  miscellaneous.
SOURCES
Exports  to  OECD and  LDCt  COMTRADE  System,  World  Bank  as reported  by importing
countries,  except  for  exports  of Hungary  and  Yugoslavia  which are reported  by
exporter. Exports  to  socialist  countries  are  World  Bank  estimates  based  oni  CMEA
data  provided  to  various  World  Bank  Country  Economlc  Missions  and  shown  in  most
recent  country  reports.48
TABLE B.  LABOR '1RCE COMPOSITION
For Most Recent Da_  Available 1986-1987
Agriculture  Manufacturing  Construction  Services
& Mining  &  Utilities  _  _
United States  4Z  201  71  70Z
Japan  82  25Z  9Z  581
France  72  231  71  63Z
Italy  11  22Z  9X  58X
United Kingdom  32  23Z  62  68Z
W. Germany  6Z  332  7?  55Z
Group Average  7Z  252  7Z  61Z
Greece  28X  212  62  452
Ireland  162  201  7?  572
Portugal  23Z  252  92  43Z
Spain  162  232  8Z  532
Group Average  21Z  22Z  72  501
Korea  23Z  27Z  6Z  44Z
Malaysia  32Z  162  6?  452
Singapore  1Z  271  8Z  64Z
Thailand  64Z  102  3?  242
Group Average  302  202  6Z  44Z
Bulgaria  212  352  92  36Z
Czechoslovakia  16Z  351  82  41Z
Hungary  21Z  31?  7Z  412
Poland  32Z  25Z  82  34Z
Romania  292  372  72  27Z
USSR  192  292  9Z  43Z
Yugoslavia  72  411  9Z  432
Group Average  21Z  332  8Z  38Z
SOURCE:  International Labour Organization, Year Book of Labour Statistics, Geneva
1988.49
TABLE  C.  EDUCATION  RATES
Percentage  of total  population  achieving  various  levels  of  education  per  year  for  the
year 1987  or that  most recently  available
Tertiary  Graduation  Secondary  Education  F:imary
Four-year  Programs  (four  years**)  Education
Non-vocat. Vocational* Non-vocat. Vocational  (Grad!e  ***)
Canada  0.48Z  0.07Y  1.49Z  1.432
United  States  O.472  0.09S  1.37Z  1.33Z
Japan  0.232  0.10?  1.07Z  0.15?  1.42?
France  0.36?  0.03?  1.342  0.402  1.422
Italy  0.132  0.02?  1.58?  0.84?  1.29?
Spain  0.221  0.03?  0.97Z  0.35?  1.93Z
West  Germany  0.18?  0.06?  1.06?  0.612  0.95?
Korea  0.29?  0.12Z  1.232  0.26?  1.83S
Malaysia  0.05S  0.012  1.15?  0.40?  1.42?
Singapore  0.12?  0.042  1.87?  0.84?  1.29?
Thailand  0.01?  0.00?  0.40?  0.35Z  1.93?
Bulgaria  0.11?  0.08?  0.11?  0.15?  1.71?
Czechoslovakia  0.10?  0.11?  0.21?  0.31?  1.72?
Hungary  0.09?  0.032  0.25?  0.71?  1.68?
Poland  0.12?  0.06?  0.22?  0.72?  1.74?
Romania  0.05?  0.08?  0.05?  0.62?
USSR  0.16?  0.11?  0.82?  0.15?  1.64?
Yugoslavia  0.09?  0.04?  1.29?  0.52?  1.53?
SOURCE: 1989  UNESCO  Statistical  Yearbook.
*  Vocational  education  is  defined  as arts  and  crafts,  engineering  and  architecture,
services  trades,  and  agriculture.  Non-vocational  includes  all  of the  sciences  and
humanities,  law,  education,  and  business.
**  Percentage  of  total  population  enrolled  in  fourth  secondary  year,  third  year  in  the
case  of Italy.
***  Percentage  of total  population  enrolled  in fifth  grade,  fourth  grade  in the  case
of Yugoslavia  and  West  Germany.
Tertiary  education  rates  include  lower  levels  of post-secondary  education.
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